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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR GREATER ATTENTION TO ECONOMY, THRIFT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 86 p 1

[Editorial: "To Learn Thriftiness"]

[Text]

At the present stage of accelerating the nation's socioeconomic development, our party has posed the urgent task of turning economy into the decisive source for satisfying the national economy with additional material resources. The struggle for economy and thriftiness in the Armed Forces is assuming ever-broader scope.

The personnel of the Army and Navy are working to extend the service lives of the combat equipment and to make thrifty use of electric power, fuel and lubricants and military supplies and are endeavoring to efficiently use the training facilities and increase the profitability of the military sovkhoses and subsidiary farms. It is important that an economy drive encompass all elements of the army and navy organism.

This letter has been emphasized in many letters from our readers. In discussing the new wording for the draft of the CPSU Program, the Party By-Laws and the Main Directions for the Economic and Social Development for the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Up to the Year 2000, they have voiced profound concern over the economic attitude toward public property and have shared the existing experience. Maj V. Rudenko from the Leningrad Military District has announced the establishing of trainers which, in training the personnel, make it possible to save on motor life of the equipment and fuel. Guards Maj V. Khomutov from the Moscow Military District has written that strict discipline in the training process and concern for the rational use of each minute of combat training have had a positive impact upon increasing the combat skill of the tank troops as well as saving ammunition and motor life.

Many examples could be given where by the efforts of the commanders, the political bodies, the staffs, the rear workers and each man significant material resources have been saved. The achievements, work methods and the valuable experience of the thrifty, careful men and the leading subunits, units and ships should become evermore widespread in the troops. To learn

thriftiness from the experience of the pacesetters is an important demand of the times.

However, within this important question there still is no proper system, study or planning. On the spot advanced experience is frequently not analyzed and not disseminated. It happens that units and subunits which have achieved significant successes in the saving of materiel are next to those in which mismanagement and wastefulness reign. In formation X, for example, there have been numerous instances of a truly efficient attitude toward the savings of materiel. At the same time, in the subunits under Capts 2d Rank L. Krivenko and V. Kapelskiy they "forced" the filling of cranks irrationally, without working out the specific combat training tasks. From the Baltic Military District Col A. Krasilnikov has informed us of a simple helicopter trainer and that in the unit the methods of saving aviation fuel by introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress into combat training are not being employed.

Such facts must not be tolerated. Under present-day conditions, when the troops and naval forces have become unprecedentedly saturated with complex expensive weapons and combat equipment, it is important that each commander, staff officer and chief of a service, in making his contribution to the organization of combat training and troop service, be able to think economically and teach the men to practically use the experience of the thrifty. More attention must be given to innovation and the intensification of the training process and to the efficient use of trainer facilities and we must learn to thriftily consume the resources of combat equipment, ammunition, fuel, electric power and other materiel.

The struggle for economy and thriftiness is a party matter. The commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations must thoroughly explain the party's economic policy at the present stage. The questions of economy and thriftiness should be extensively brought out in the course of political and economic studies, raised in lectures and reports and widely taken up in visual agitation. It is important to see to it that each serviceman, worker and employee of the Army and Navy is profoundly aware that the struggle for economy is not an abstract concept and that everyone is involved in it. It is essential to constantly and patiently teach thriftiness to everyone because wastefulness harms the most important thing for which the men are working, the state of combat readiness.

In the struggle for economy and thriftiness an important role is played by economic work in the troops. It is essential to learn to safeguard the equipment and weapons, motor life, barracks and housing, supplies, food, fuel and electric power, to conscientiously keep track of money, to learn to manage in breaking away from the inertia of old systems.

A decisive turn to the efficient use of material resources requires a psychological readjustment of consciousness and the shaping of a new style of economic thinking among military personnel. It is essential to learn to correlate expenditures with the obtained results in carrying out any measure and to economically weigh and back up each decision.

The struggle for economy and thriftiness is a most important area for the socialist competition. It is important that the experience of the advanced soldiers, units and subunits be generalized aptly and thoroughly in summing up the results. We must not tolerate instances when behind the figure indicators of an economic effect we lose the human factor, that is, the personal example of each man in a thrifty attitude toward public property. Good rivalry must mobilize the men to work in a new way, creatively and with initiative.

The organs of the Army and Navy press must become a real forum of experience. Unfortunately, at times the articles in newspapers and journals on the questions of economy have a superficial nature. They list the successes and shortcomings but lack analysis of the components of thriftiness and go little into the character traits of the people who can think and act in an efficient manner considering the state interests. More space must be provided to the creators of advanced experience including enterprising commanders, skillful administrators, inventors and innovators. Fewer general discussions and more concern for the simple, everyday matter of saving each drop of water and fuel, everything where unused reserves for economy are to be found.

To learn thriftiness means to ensure the effective use of the public funds allocated for state defense in the name of increasing the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

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MILITARY SCIENCE

MAJ GEN TYUSHKEVICH REVIEWS PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

Moscow POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE in Russian No 1, 1986 (Signed to press 20 Dec 85) pp 30-37

[Article by Maj Gen S. Tyushkevich, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor: "One of the Most Important Functions of the Popular State"; passages enclosed in slant-lines printed in boldface]

[Text] Fightingmen of the Armed Forces and all of the Soviet people are advancing toward the 27th party congress firmly confident that the communist ideals will triumph. Fulfilling decisions of the April and October 1985 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, they are enthusiastically implementing the program of accelerated social and economic development for the homeland and working selflessly for the sake of peace, to further improve the people's welfare and to increase the homeland's defensive strength. /"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,"/ the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program states, /"regards protecting the socialist homeland, strengthening the nation's defense and ensuring the state's security as one of the most important functions of the Soviet popular state"/.

History has taught us that as long as there exists the danger of the unleashing of aggression, military conflicts and various kinds of provocations by imperialism, we must devote unweakened attention to increasing the USSR's defensive strength and enhancing its security. Our Armed Forces must always be prepared to thwart imperialism's intrigues against the USSR and its allies and to rout any aggressor.

The peace-loving foreign policy course worked out by the party and consistently implemented by the Soviet State, combined with the strengthening of the nation's defense capability, have provided our people and most of the planet's population with a peaceful life for the longest period in the 20th Century.

The Ending of Wars and Peace Among Peoples--Our Ideal

We know that the first decree of Soviet power was the Peace Decree. Russia's workers' and peasants' government, established as a result of the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, called upon all warring peoples and their governments to immediately begin talks on the concluding of a universal, just and democratic peace. War was declared to be "the greatest crime against mankind."

However, the imperialist powers responded to this noble appeal with armed intervention against the young Soviet Republic, by organizing conspiracies and supporting counterrevolutionary insurrections. They attempted to overthrow the power of the soviets and restore the antipopular, bourgeois-landowner order.

"Any revolution," V.I. Lenin stressed, "is only worth something if it is able to defend itself...." ("Poln sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 122). From the first days of Soviet power, the Communist Party demonstrated and continues to demonstrate constant concern for strengthening the nation's defense capability.

On the basis of Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist homeland, the party created the Armed Forces of a new type, always prepared to protect the Soviet people's peaceful creative labor against aggressive encroachments from without. Unlike the imperialist armies, which are a bulwark and defender of the exploitative classes and a means of suppressing the workers, our Armed Forces were created as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They were of an openly class nature, were made up of members of the working class and strata of the peasantry close to it, and defended their interests. "Imperialists of the entire world," V.I. Lenin wrote in 1919, "leapt upon the Russian Republic in order to stifle it, but we began creating an army, the first in history to know what it was fighting and making sacrifices for and to successfully resist a larger enemy..." (Vol 38, p 51).

Having defended the workers' and peasants' republic, the Soviet people set about restoring the economy and building socialism. The party took into account the fact that our nation was in capitalist encirclement and that the imperialist aggressors could attack it at any time, and it followed Vladimir Ilich's conclusions that while engaging in peaceful construction, we must be on the alert and look after the defense capability of the nation and the Red Army as a treasured possession (Vol 44, p 300).

The nation's industrialization and the successes of the defense industry led to the technical reequipping of the army and navy. The party took steps to produce new types of aircraft, tanks, artillery, etc. The restructuring of the Armed Forces had basically been completed by the end of the 2nd Five-Year Plan.

Profound qualitative changes occurred in the spiritual makeup of the soldiers and commanders. These were the builders and defenders of socialism, sons of an ideologically and politically united people.

Decisions coming out of the 18th VKP(b) [All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Congress in March of 1939 and the 18th All-Union party conference in February of 1941 were highly important. The various branches of the defense industry were developing at accelerated rates, plants were being built, and large energy and fuel reserves and a powerful metallurgical and petroleum base were being created in the eastern part of the nation. The 1939 Law on Universal Military Duty consolidated the transition to a unified cadre principle for the organizational development of the nation's Armed Forces. Their numerical strength increased more than 2.8-fold between September 1939 and June 1941, reaching 5.4 million, and their fighting power was greatly enhanced. Despite the enormous efforts of the party and the people, we did not succeed in accomplishing everything we had planned completely and in a timely manner.

The Great Patriotic War was a rigorous test of the new order and its army. Guided by the Communist Party and overcoming enormous difficulties, the Soviet people and our Armed Forces withstood, halted and routed the assault force of world imperialist reaction.

"With its victory," states the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program, "the Soviet Union made the decisive contribution to the liberation of Europe's peoples from Nazi enslavement, to the rescue of world civilization from the obscurantism of Hitlerism. The total defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism opened up new possibilities for the peoples' struggle for peace, democracy, national liberation and socialism. The Soviet people's victory raised the Soviet State's international prestige to a high level."

More than 68 years have gone by since the passage of Lenin's Peace Decree. The noble goals proclaimed by V.I. Lenin at the dawn of Soviet power remain immutable: "The ending of wars, peace among peoples and the halting of plunder and violence--these are our ideal..." (Vol 26, p 304).

The Army of the Popular State

Within a short period of time the USSR had healed the serious wounds of the war, considerably strengthened its economic, scientific and technical, and defense capability, and consolidated its international position. Socialism had achieved complete and final victory in the USSR. As a result of the Soviet people's determined labor and the large successes achieved in the economy, in the social and political areas and in the development of science and culture, our nation entered the phase of developed socialism.

Based on the specific situation, the CPSU creatively approached the task of defining the Armed Forces' place and role in our society and in the system of international relations, and the assessment of their nature, their specific features and the paths for military organizational development. It is the social and historical purpose of the army of the popular state to guard the peaceful, creative labor and reliably defend the socialist homeland. This means that from the standpoint of internal conditions, our society does not need an army.

The Armed Forces of the popular state reflect the humanistic essence of the socialism we are building and the nobleness of its concepts.

/In the first place/, the Armed Forces of the popular state are a part of the Soviet people, of the new historical community of people formed on the basis of public ownership of the means of production, unity of economic, social and political, and cultural life, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the socialist interests and communists ideals of the working class. The Armed Forces in turn reflect the will and the interests of the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia, the working people of all the country's nations and ethnic groups. The unity of the army and the people is growing stronger and stronger in the course of building communism. It is reliably ensured by the society's guiding and directing force, the Communist Party.

/In the second place/, the modern Armed Forces have a broader and more mature social basis than previously. The equalization of the working class, the kolkhoz

peasantry and the intelligentsia, and the development of a classless structure for the society, the working class having the crucial role in this process, is an important law of development of social relations at the contemporary stage.

The effect of this natural law is that it is now difficult to distinguish the worker, the kolkhoz worker or the intellectual in any military collective with respect to social activeness or culture. Fulfilling the unified requirements of Soviet laws, military regulations and the oath, the rank and file and the commanders, subordinates and chiefs, attempt to establish their relations in a spirit of social justice, collectivism, army and navy comradeship, and communist moral principles. Today, particular importance is being assigned to strengthening military discipline and enhancing every serviceman's sense of responsibility for the homeland's security.

/Thirdly/, fraternity of our homeland's peoples is an extremely important feature of the Armed Forces. Socialism has given millions of laboring people access to cultural achievements and made all sources of knowledge available to every individual, regardless of his social position or nationality. Broad possibilities have been created in the country for the flourishing of all nations and ethnic groups and for creative activity by the masses. The Soviet people's unified international culture serves all of the workers.

The flourishing and the equalization of nations permeate all areas of life of the socialist society, making it stronger and more stable and ensuring the further unification of the entire people.

Soviet power has introduced all nations and ethnic groups to the honored duty of defending the homeland. When the USSR was founded, fightingmen of the non-Russian nationalities, which accounted for around 47 percent of the population, comprised only 25 percent of the servicemen. The sons of more than 100 nations, nationalities, national and ethnic groups now serve in the country's Armed Forces. Soldiers and seamen of many different nationalities stand combat watch in almost every military collective.

The inviolable friendship of peoples of the USSR, life-giving Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism constitute one of the sources of strength for our Armed Forces. Consistent implementation of the Lenin national policy and the all-around strengthening of friendship of peoples as a component of the process of perfecting socialism are contributing to the unification of the military collectives.

/Fourthly/, the Armed Forces of the USSR are internationalist also from the standpoint of international relations. They are linked by combat friendship with the armies of nations in the Warsaw Pact, which for 30 years now has helped to reliably protect the peaceful labor of the fraternal peoples and has been an important factor in the preservation of peace in Europe and throughout the world. The ideological, social and political, economic and strategic military bases of this defense coalition of socialist states and their combined power are steadily being strengthened and expanded, and the combat readiness and combat capability of the allied armies are intensifying and increasing. They are working in close unity to perfect their combat skill, to acquire more experience in the joint defense of socialism and peace, and to add to the glorious traditions of international solidarity.

The Communist Party's increasing guiding role is a significant feature of the development of the common popular state's army at the contemporary stage. This is an objective natural law. It is brought about, among other things, by such factors as the increased complexity of military affairs, the social processes and internal political conditions resulting from imperialism's increasing aggressiveness, by the need to enhance vigilance and ensure the nation's security, and for new and more persistent efforts to control the forces of aggression, halt the arms race, rid mankind of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and consolidate peace on earth. "The Communist Party's direction of military organizational development and of the Armed Forces," the draft of the new edition of the CPSU Program states, "is the basic principle underlying the strengthening of the socialist homeland's defenses. With the party performing the directing role, we are working out and implementing policy in the area of defense and national security, and Soviet military doctrine, which is purely defensive and aimed at providing protection against attack from outside."

Political organs, party and Komsomol organizations and people's control are active in the units and formations. The party organizations, the draft CPSU Charter states, "assure that party policy is implemented in the Armed Forces, unite their personnel round the Communist Party, indoctrinate the fightingmen in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist concepts and selfless devotion to the socialist homeland, actively promote the strengthening of unity of the army and the people, work to enhance the combat readiness of the forces and strengthen military discipline, and mobilize the personnel for the accomplishment of the combat and political training tasks, for mastering the new equipment and weapons and for the irreproachable fulfillment of their military duty, orders and instructions from command." Communists in the Armed Forces closely coordinate their activities with the work of local party and Komsomol organizations.

The CPSU works out scientifically based military policy, defines the army and navy's missions and ways to develop them, and directs the activities of state and economic agencies in charge of equipping and provisioning the Armed Forces. Our army and navy are now a powerful combat organism united by the concepts of Marxism-Leninism and by their lofty purpose of selflessly serving the people and the cause of defending the great gains of October and world socialism. They possess everything necessary for this.

Changes in the materiel base of the Soviet Army and Navy have transformed all services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops. The Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces and the Navy, as well as the border and internal troops, measure up to modern requirements with respect to organizational structure and technical equipment. We know, however, that military equipment and organization alone do not assure victory. The fightingmen, their combat skill, their morale and their ability to withstand extremely difficult trials and not lose their will to win constitute the paramount factor. The powerful equipment in the Soviet Army is in the dependable hands of people infinitely devoted to the homeland and the ideals of communism. Almost 100 percent of the fightingmen now have a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. Most of the officers are below the age of 30 years, and more than 70 percent of them have a higher military or specialized military education.

In its leadership of the army and navy the CPSU takes into account the fact that military service is a school not just of combat skill, but one of indoctrination, ideological and physical conditioning, discipline and organization. In the course of their combat and political training, the youth continue to develop a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, a communist attitude toward work, good moral and physical qualities. The fightingmen are strengthened politically and ideologically, which helps them to correctly understand events in the nation and abroad. The best qualities of a citizen--fervent patriotism, a sense of responsibility to the people for the assigned job and for one's actions, industry, honor, willpower and endurance--are developed and strengthened during the years of military service. People with these qualities are needed for both building and defending the new society.

The Soviet Army and Navy are a part of the Soviet people. They can therefore not stand on the sideline of the people's constructive work. The military collectives take an active part in the nation's political, public and economic life. Many thousands of fightingmen have been elected deputies in the soviets and members of directing party organs. Personnel of the units and ships maintain ties with the workers of enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Soviet fightingmen participate directly in the nation's economic life. Without detriment to their military service, they help the kolkhoz and sovkhoz workers harvest the crops and take part in the development of territorial production complexes (the building of BAM, for example). When necessary, fightingmen help the population to combat the effects of natural disasters. Upon being released into the reserve, many young people travel to shock construction sites, including those in areas with harsh conditions, and are model laborers there. The people rightly call their army a school of courage, industry and great morality.

Always on the Alert

The law of inevitability of a world war which manifested itself during the first half of the 20th Century stopped operating with the establishment of the world socialist system and the change in the balance of power in the international arena to the benefit of peoples struggling for social progress, democracy, national liberty and peace. As early as the '50s, the CPSU concluded that the inevitability of war no longer existed.

"The CPSU proceeds from the premise," the draft new edition of the Program stresses, "that no matter how great the threat to peace created by the policy of imperialism's aggressive circles, /there is no inevitability of war. War can be prevented, and mankind can be protected from catastrophe. This is the historical calling of socialism, of all progressive, peace-loving forces on our planet"/.

Despite the fact that the causes of world wars, rooted in the nature of imperialism, remain, objective factors have come into being which help to prevent their rise and their practical realization, and the capability of the forces of peace has been strengthened. These factors include the active and consistently peace-loving policy of the socialist states, their growing economic and defense might. They include the policy of the vast majority of states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which are vitally interested in preserving peace and halting the arms race. They include the antiwar movement by extremely broad popular masses on

all continents. Sober consideration of the actual balance of power is leading to an understanding of the danger involved in continuing and expanding the arms race also by many statesmen and political figures of the capitalist nations.

The imperialist forces are capable of creating and might create situations in which world war appears to be a real possibility, of course. By frightening peoples with the fabricated "Soviet military threat," reactionary circles in the West have launched an unprecedented arms race. They are inciting a militaristic psychosis and trying to destroy the strategic balance between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, that which is restraining their adventurous actions. The United States is implementing dangerous programs involving the deployment of new types of strategic weapons and space weapons systems.

The Communist Party and the Soviet State cannot ignore this. The CPSU Central Committee and our government consider it their sacred duty to the Soviet people constantly to maintain our defense capability at the proper level, and they are doing everything possible to see that the Armed Forces have everything necessary to reliably defend the homeland and our allies, to see that no one is able to catch us unawares.

"The American Administration," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stated at the 4th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "has still not escaped the temptation to test the possibility of achieving military superiority. Right now, as they plot the arms race in space, they are thinking of surpassing us in electronics and computers. We shall find a response, however. This has happened more than once in the past. Furthermore, it will be an effective and fairly rapid response, and perhaps less expensive than the American program.

In the contemporary situation our Armed Forces are performing one external function, which includes three most important focuses. /In the first place/, they are protecting the socialist gains, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, and creating favorable external conditions for perfecting the socialist society and advancing toward communism in our nation. /In the second place/, they are protecting the world social system and, together with the fraternal Warsaw Pact armies, ensuring the security of the entire socialist commonwealth. /In the third place/, they are preserving universal peace and maintaining international security for purposes of preventing a world war and thwarting imperialist aggression and the export of counterrevolution. No other army in history has ever had such great and humane objectives.

The policy of our party and the Soviet State in the area of national defense is therefore absolutely clear--everything necessary for an effective defense, and nothing more than that. The USSR has never armed simply for the sake of armament, and it has not and will not be the instigator of an arms race. The facts prove that in the situation of extremely acute confrontation between the two social systems, plans for a nuclear attack on the USSR have not been realized only because the Soviet Union eliminated the USA's monopoly on weapons of mass destruction and, together with the other socialist nations, created strategic military parity between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. This is an exceptionally important, historic achievement. It has strengthened

the position of the USSR, the other socialist nations and all progressive forces. Preserving this parity is a real guarantee of peace and international security. The CPSU is therefore firmly pursuing a course which will not permit the existing strategic military parity to be destroyed and which is aimed at reducing the level to the point of total disarmament. Achieving this will preserve lasting peace.

The World War II experience taught us that we can never ignore a challenge issued to the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations by imperialism's reactionary forces, and taught us to constantly maintain a high level of vigilance to prevent an aggressor from catching us unawares. In the contemporary situation, the surprise attack is a factor of strategic importance with extremely grave consequences. As they create the new society and conduct the peace-loving policy, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are therefore in a state of constant combat readiness to repel the lovers of military adventures.

The CPSU's ideological work to indoctrinate the workers in a spirit of patriotism and friendship of peoples of the USSR and of proletarian, socialist internationalism contributes to the growth of the combat strength of the Soviet Army and Navy. The party concerns itself with developing in every Soviet individual well-defined class positions, a high level of political vigilance, firm conviction with respect to the correctness and the invincibility of socialism. The CPSU works constantly to enhance the effectiveness of the military patriotic indoctrination of the workers and the youth. Fightingmen of the army and navy make a definite contribution to this work.

A high level of combat readiness in the fightingmen of our Armed Forces involves the following: in the political respect, devotion to the cause of communism and irreconcilability toward the enemies of the working class and the working people, and toward imperialism; in the military respect, the ability to thwart the enemy's aggressive plans at any time; and in the moral-psychological respect, a constant state of complete readiness for action and the ability in the fightingmen to retain their courage, steadfastness and heroism and to demonstrate it in the most critical situations.

The draft new edition of the CPSU Program states that the Lenin party will continue to undeviatingly work to see that the combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces consists of a solid alloy of military skill, ideological steadfastness, organization and discipline on the part of the personnel, their loyalty to their patriotic and international duty, and a high level of technical equipment. The CPSU considers it to be its duty to further strengthen its organizing and directing influence upon the life and functioning of the Armed Forces, to strengthen the principle of one-man command, to enhance the role and influence of political organs and party organizations of the army and navy, and to strive to see that the vital ties between the army and the people grow even stronger. Every Communist and every Soviet individual, the document states, is required to do everything within his power to maintain the nation's defense capability at the proper level.

It is the sacred duty of all Soviet people to strengthen the homeland's economic and defensive might with their labor. The restructuring of the national economy on the basis of the latest achievements of scientific and technological progress,

the competition to fulfill and exceed plans, the strengthening of discipline, organization and order, and a readiness to overcome all difficulties for the sake of the homeland--all of these things are a manifestation of the Soviet individual's great patriotic duty. It is particularly important to fulfill party plans for the 12th Five-Year Plan and for the period extending to the year 2000. The accomplishment of the tasks set forth in the draft Main Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR will make it possible to uplift the Soviet society to a higher level of economic and social progress.

The Geneva meeting between Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Reagan was an extremely important political event in international life. A fundamentally important result of the meeting was the fact that the leaders of the USSR and the USA declared in a joint document: A nuclear war must not be unleashed. They stressed the importance of preventing any kind of war between the USSR and the USA, nuclear or conventional, and committed themselves not to try to achieve military superiority. In this respect, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee stressed, the results of the Geneva talks could have a positive effect with respect to altering the political and psychological climate in contemporary international relations, improving them, and reduce the threat of nuclear war. The results of the meeting must be used for accelerating talks on nuclear and space weapons based on the joint Soviet-American statement of 8 January 1985, which has now been affirmed at the highest level. At the same time, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee stressed, the fact that talks are continuing should not serve as a justification or a cover for the arms race. The principle task is that of eliminating the nuclear threat by preventing the arms race from spreading into space and curtailing it on Earth. Its accomplishment will require a responsible approach, continuing effort and a contribution on the part of all states and peace-loving social and political forces.

The real significance of all that on which the parties agreed in Geneva can only be manifested in practical deeds, in a determination to strive concretely to curtail the arms race on Earth, to prevent an arms race in space and to improve the international situation, and in the development of all-around, mutually advantageous cooperation.

The CPSU has consistently stressed the fact that the USSR will continue to firmly follow the Lenin course of peace and peaceful coexistence defined by our social system, by our morals and our world outlook. "History itself and not theoretical determinations and reasoning," Comrade M.S. Gorbachev stated at a press conference in Geneva on 21 November 1985, "has confirmed the vitality of the policy of peaceful coexistence." It conforms to the interests of all peoples of the world.

The concept of peaceful coexistence permeates all important initiatives of the USSR and its peace-loving and constructive proposals. Their essence is clear and simple: to lessen the threat of a nuclear war, to diminish the likelihood that one will occur and to eliminate war from the life of human society.

In its struggle for a turn for the better in world affairs the USSR will continue to interact closely with its allies in the Warsaw Pact and with all of the

socialist commonwealth nations, doing everything possible to promote the strengthening of their unity, their cohesion and solidarity, to increase and improve all-around cooperation.

The third CPSU Program, the draft of its new edition stresses, is a program of struggle for peace and social progress. It confirms the fact that socialism's plans and actions in the international arena serve the main task of preserving and strengthening peace.

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WARSAW PACT

IMPORTANCE OF PARITY BETWEEN NATO, WARSAW PACT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences, Lt Col Ye. Zyuzin: "An Instrument of Collective Security"]

[Text] The new wording of the draft Program of the CPSU envisages as the main task in the foreign policy area, the eliminating of the threat of a world war and the achieving of universal security and disarmament. In consistently carrying out a peace-loving policy, the party at the same time, in the situation of the existence of the threat from imperialism, has been forced to be constantly concerned with strengthening the security of the socialist state and raising the defense capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. "Under the conditions, as long as the imperialist NATO military bloc exists," states the new wording of the draft CPSU Program, "the party considers it essential to assist in every possible way in improving the activities of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of collective defense against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and the joint struggle for a lasting peace and the broadening of international collaboration."

The many-years activities of the Warsaw Pact has shown how correct and essential was the measure of establishing this defensive military-political union of the socialist states in response to the intensified direct military danger and as a counterweight to the aggressive NATO bloc. The historical experience of all-round collaboration between the fraternal nations has confirmed the vitality of Lenin's ideas on the need for a close alliance between the socialist states and the integration of their political, economic and military efforts in the cause of defending their common interests. The united might of the allied countries has repeatedly been an insurmountable barrier on the path of imperialism's hegemonistic aspirations.

The questions of strengthening the defense capability of the allied states have been constantly at the center of attention of the communist and workers parties and the governments of the Warsaw Pact countries. Of fundamental significance is the unswerving defensive focus of the Joint Armed Forces of the fraternal states. They have never been used for making threats against other countries and aggressive, predatory aspirations are alien to them. Their basic task has been and remains to defend the socialist victories of the

peoples, to repel outside aggression and to maintain military equilibrium on the European continent.

The communist and workers parties of the Warsaw Pact states must take into account that aggressive imperialist forces interested in maintaining tension and accelerating the arms race continue to be active in the world. These are primarily those circles of monopolistic capital which receive colossal profits from producing ever-newer types of weapons. These are the near-sighted politicians who, in fostering an arms race, would like to turn it into a means of economically wearing down socialism and into a lever for applying strong military pressure on forces not to their liking on the international scene in order to thus ensure themselves world domination.

As is shown by an analysis of the decisions on military questions taken recently in the West, the militaristic policy of achieving U.S. and NATO military supremacy over the USSR and Warsaw Pact remains unchanged. The military-political leadership of the North Atlantic bloc, in hiding behind declarative statements on approving the results of the Soviet-American Geneva Summit, as before is continuing to wager on a policy from a position of strength vis-a-vis the states of the socialist commonwealth.

In viewing armed forces as the most important instrument for carrying out such a policy, the American administration has done everything to further increase the combat capabilities of the NATO armies. At a session held at the end of last year of the NATO Military Planning Committee, for example, a decision was taken to arm the NATO Joint Armed Forces with qualitatively new types of weapons and military equipment developed on the basis of advanced technology.

All of this creates a serious threat to the security of the peoples of Europe and the entire world. During the nuclear age, a world which is armed to the teeth and continuing to arm is fraught with the possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear war even if it is assumed that no one wants this. Such a world is fragile and unstable.

The aggressive policy of imperialism and its active desire to achieve strategic supremacy over the Warsaw Pact states are being opposed by the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers parties by clear and consistent initiatives aimed at strengthening peace, checking and halting the arms race, eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and a just settlement to crisis situations at the conference table.

The policy of the fraternal socialist countries, in being aimed at improving the international situation, has again found vivid expression in the statement of the Warsaw Pact states "For Eliminating the Nuclear Threat and a Turn to the Better in European and World Affairs" as approved unanimously last year in Sofia. Under the conditions of the tense and at times explosive situation in Europe and the world, the leaders of the socialist states have indicated the real ways for reducing the military threat. In improving the mechanism of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact, they have expressed the determination of the fraternal countries to subsequently wage a consistent struggle for the peaceful future of our planet.

The new, broad Soviet peace initiatives set out in the Statement of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M. S. Gorbachev, have become vivid proof of the humane course of socialism on the international scene. The Soviet proposals, in expressing the will of the world's peoples, have encountered a strong response among all progressive mankind. The Comprehensive Peace Program of the Soviet Union has been approved and supported by all the Warsaw Pact states. In encompassing all the major spheres and areas of activity in the interests of disarmament, it is aimed at eliminating the military threat to mankind and points out a clear prospect for the safe future of all the world's peoples.

Of major importance is the European aspect of the new Soviet peace initiatives. From the viewpoint of the CPSU and the Soviet government, this is exceptionally important both for Europe itself and for the entire world. Precisely on the European Continent, at present all conditions can be found for overcoming the separation of East and West, particularly on the questions of security and mutually advantageous cooperation.

The USSR and the other allied countries are unanimous that a reduction in the level of the military confrontation in Europe, in maintaining an approximate military-strategic equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact states and the NATO countries, is a realistic way to achieve dependable security for the peoples of the continent and the entire planet. There is no type of weapons which the Warsaw Pact states would not be ready to limit, reduce, remove from arsenals and destroy once and for all on the basis of an agreement with the other states and in observing the principle of equality and equal security.

At the same time, the peoples of the European socialist countries, in being united in a military-political union, have not forgotten the lessons of history. In remembering the aggressive essence of imperialism, they are keeping their powder dry. The Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact states represent a powerful monolith. Totally dedicated to the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, the men of the fraternal armies are securely defending the socialist victories of the peoples.

The further strengthening of the defense might of the Warsaw Pact states is ensured by the ever-increasing economic potential of the allied states and by the maximum use of scientific and technical achievements by each of them in common interests. Although the economy of the Warsaw Pact states is aimed primarily at achieving the peaceful goals of socialist and communist construction, it also does make it possible in a short period of time to develop any weapons, if this is required in response to the military challenge of imperialism.

For more than 30 years, the Warsaw Pact has guarded peace and socialism in Europe, symbolizing the unbreakable unity of the peoples and armies in the fraternal socialist countries. The new wording of the draft CPSU Program has running through it as a constant theme the notion that the unity of actions of the CPSU and the other fraternal parties of the socialist countries in the area of foreign policy and the international armed defense of the victories of socialism has been and remains an important factor for strengthening the positions of the socialist countries and for their effective struggle for social progress, peace and the security of peoples. The key to the undefeatable defense might of the Warsaw Pact states lies in the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers parties over the question of the defense of the allied countries.

ARMED FORCES

MILITARY FARMS: SOCIALIST COMPETITION CHALLENGE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 86 p 1

[Unattributed article: "To Increase Productivity of the Fields and Farms"]

[Text] The collective of the Orlovskiy Military Sovkhoz of the Central Food Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense has fulfilled ahead of time its plan quotas and socialist obligations for 1985 and the five-year plan as a whole.

A meeting was held at the sovkhaz where the workers and employees adopted socialist obligations for 1986, the starting year of the 12th Five-Year Plan. The conference participants unanimously approved the appeal to all workers of the military sovkhazes and agricultural enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense urging them to develop a socialist competition under the motto: "We Will Fulfill the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and Strengthen the Motherland's Defense Capability by Shock Work!"

Having weighed its possibilities and reserves, the sovkhaz collective has assumed the following socialist obligations:

- 1) On the basis of accelerating scientific and technical progress and strengthening labor discipline and order, to fulfill the main plan quotas and socialist obligations by 20 December 1986. To provide an increase of 3.3 percent in agricultural product in 1986 in comparison with the level of the 11th Five-Year Plan. By the day of the opening of the 27th CPSU Congress, to fulfill the 2-month production plan and complete repairs and reparation of the farm equipment for the spring field work;
- 2) On the basis of intensified methods for raising agricultural crops, the rational use of organic and mineral fertilizers and the prompt carrying out of all farm work, to obtain 210 quintals of potatoes per hectare and 400 quintals of vegetables per hectare;
- 3) In making maximum use of the experience of the advanced farms, to have each layer chicken produce 260 eggs with a plan of 250, to milk 4,900 kg of milk from each cow with a plan of 4,520 kg and an average fat content of 4 percent. To obtain average daily weight increases of young cattle of at least 600 gm;

4) In applying advanced forms of production organization and a collective contract, using moral and material incentives, to achieve an above-plan rise in labor productivity of at least 1.1 percent and a reduction in product costs of an additional 0.6 percent over the plan and obtain a net profit of at least 1.7 million rubles;

5) To constantly increase the level of economic work, to strengthen control over the observance of the economy and thriftiness at each work area and to achieve the rational utilization of fuel-energy and other resources. To provide a savings of at least 2.5 percent in electric power, gas and water, at least 3 percent for fuels and lubricants and at least 2 percent for spare parts and rubber;

6) To mobilize all the sovkhos employees for a universal struggle to improve the quality of the produced products. To see to it that at least 98 percent of the milk sales is of first quality and to deliver to the troops at least 90 percent of the eggs of a higher category;

7) To profoundly study and propagandize the materials and decisions of the 27th Party Congress, the CPSU Program and By-Laws and the Basic Directions of Soviet Economic and Social Development for 1986-1990 and for the Period Up to the Year 2000. The basic efforts of political indoctrination are to be aimed at increasing labor productivity, the production and social activeness of the workers and employees and the strengthening of discipline and order.

The sovkhos workers and employees call upon all workers of the agricultural enterprises under the USSR Ministry of Defense to join actively in the socialist competition for fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan quotas and for carrying out the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

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ARMED FORCES

COL GEN KOMAROV CRITICIZES UNIT MEDICAL TREATMENT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Med Serv F. Komarov, chief of the Central Military Medical Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "Military Medicine: A Policy of Preventive Work"]

[Text] With a profound sense of satisfaction I have re-read the lines of the draft for the new wording of the CPSU Program, where the tasks of improving health and increasing the length of a person's active life are viewed as a question of primary importance.

In order to clearly see what tasks are now being carried out by military medicine and what problems confront it, I feel it is essential to glance back over the distance traveled over the previous five-year plan. During these years, scores of new hospitals, polyclinics, medical buildings, sick bays and medical stations were completed in place of old ones. Their technical equipping was improved. The level of general medical work increased. All of this, certainly, could not help but tell on the health indicators of the servicemen. And health, as is known, is an important factor in troop combat capability and readiness.

For this reason we have placed particular demands on the troop medics, the largest detachment of physicians who should have a good knowledge of the specific features of military service, the living conditions of the men and their mood. Literally everything is under the supervision of the troop physician, from the slightest deviations in the methods of food preparation to studying the overloads which befall a soldier or officer under extreme conditions. He carries out the entire range of therapeutic and general medical measures and regularly holds dispensary sessions. At present, the military medical service is confronted with the task of fundamentally improving preventive work and medical supervision in the Army and Navy.

Clearly, the troop physicians should be widely trained specialists. The rapid and precise diagnosis of the patient and prompt treatment depend upon them. And ultimately this means a return to service. At present, 80 percent of the patients undergo treatment on the troop level. We feel that the time has come to have a certain reorganization in the system for advanced training of troop physicians. At present, after completing a higher institution of learning, a

troop physician is immediately sent to a regiment. However, there is a need for longer training of a beginning medic in a hospital. This task is particularly pressing in light of the demands of the new wording of the draft CPSU Program where the question is raised of a fundamental improvement in the quality of medical services.

More than 75 percent of the troop physicians are young officers. From the experience of the frontline medics who during the years of the Great Patriotic War were able to return more than 72 percent of the wounded to service, we are presently indoctrinating those who have found their calling in medicine. For me, for example, the image of Dr Kalinicheva at the Rostov Evacuation Hospital has been the ideal of a physician during all my life. At the very outset of the war, after being severely wounded, I spent 4 months in hospitals. I remember for many of us she replaced both a nurse and a mother.

At present, life provides us with many examples of the high moral qualities of medical officers whether they are operating under the bullets of the Afghan rebels in carrying out their duty as an internationalist physician or standing difficult duty in the tundra, the desert or at sea. For example, among them are the Majs Med Serv P. Lukashov and O. Bumay, Capts Med Serv R. Fardayev and S. Gerasimenko, Sr Lt Med Serv A. Petrov and many others.

The system of the unit or troop level of medical service is so organized that wherever a patient is -- in a remote garrison, on alert duty or on a cruise at sea -- everywhere prompt and skilled medical aid should be available to him. When in a remote garrison of the Central Asian Military District Sgt I. Shatilov was severely wounded and emergency aid was needed, the "artificial kidney" department of the Main Military Clinical Hospital imeni N. N. Burdenko was already ready to receive the patient. Several hours later he was delivered to Moscow. A kidney transplant was required. The newest medicines and treatment procedures were employed. The operation was a success.

At the same time, we must do a good deal of work to improve the activities of the unit medical services. At present, we can no longer tolerate the fact that at certain medical stations, examination and treatment and the organizing of emergency aid remain on a low level. Not all the troop medics have profoundly studied and analyzed the results of therapeutic work. There have been instances of an inattentive and at times criminally negligent attitude on the part of the physicians to their duties. Mistakes have been made in providing medical aid. It happens that the medical station is well equipped but the simplest laboratory research is not carried out at it. Such violations have occurred at the medical stations of the Odessa and Northern Caucasus Military Districts. We also are not satisfied by the work done in the area of preventing injuries in the Turkestan Military District and in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Unfortunately, a number of districts have permitted formalism in organizing the medical practices of the troop physicians. Certainly each medical station, sick bay, medical battalion or hospital should become a basis for training highly skilled specialists.

In the troops I have repeatedly encountered a state of affairs where the chiefs of the medical service in a division or regiment in essence have left medical work, replacing this with administration. I recall the notions of one

troop physician who dreamed of working at a large hospital with the computers, CAT scans and white coats.... But our lot involves callouses, appendicitis and supervising the cleanliness of soldiers in the bath.... It is no wonder that skills are lost. But there can be no question of such a loss of professional skills when in his daily activities a military physician hones his skill and gains maturity?! I am profoundly convinced that each medic can become an outstanding specialist only on the basis of good, general medical training. And service in the troops offers broad opportunities for this.

At present, scarcely anyone need be persuaded that the state of health depends largely upon the routine of people. This relationship has been clearly outlined in the Recommendations of the All-Army Conference on Improving Troop Routine. The responsibility of the medics for the health of the personnel is great. They should become a barrier on the path of those who permit violations in the organization of meals, water supply and the bath and laundry services. Alas, often many shortcomings in troop routine are related to the low activeness of the troop medics in providing sanitary inspection. However, much in the "health -- routine" problem depends upon the position of the commanders, the political workers and the leaders of the rear services. Can we tolerate it that some close their eyes to the reports of the medics about shortcomings influencing the health of the men and the epidemiological well being of the unit.

For example, in one of the units of the Transbaykal Military District, there have been flagrant violations in the organization of the food service and the bath and laundry services. Capt Med Serv P. Dengayev has repeatedly reported to the commander on the violation of the regulations. But each time without any result. It is no accident that morbidity among the personnel in this unit is twice as high as the average indicators for the district.

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In such instances it is essential to deal strictly not only with the medics but also with those officials who permit violations in the routine support of the personnel.

Certainly, we have given constant attention to improving other elements of the medical service. Over the last 5 years there has been a noticeable increase in the work level of many hospitals. A number of unique studies has been carried out making it possible to make a new step forward in the treatment of a number of maladies. For example, last year the many years of work of Maj Gen Med Serv V. Khilko and his colleagues in the area of neurosurgery was recognized by the awarding of the USSR State Prize.

However, everyone knows the old saw that an illness is easier to prevent than treat. Preventive work has been and remains the general line of Soviet public health. Dispensary services are one of the effective means for the early detection and, hence, prevention of illnesses. It is noteworthy that the healthy man is the main object of these services. It must be pointed out that certain servicemen do not receive these promptly and are unwilling to have an examination, for instance, of the gastrointestinal tract. This is a very flippant attitude toward one's health! Often it is precisely during dispensary services that one can detect the initial stage of an illness which initially occurs latently and promptly begin treatment. The military medics

must achieve an improvement in dispensary work, carry it out more precisely and also have the commanders give particular attention to it.

The pre-congress party documents have focused us on the mass development of physical culture and sports. And here also there is a broad field of activity for the military medics. We must not accept that in certain troop collectives there are serious shortcomings in physical training and the training facilities leave much to be desired. The medical officers themselves do not always set an example in this important matter.

The propagandizing of a healthy way of life, rational nutrition, tourism and the giving up of harmful habits should hold a special place in the work of the medics. They should be the first assistants of the commanders in the struggle for a sober way of life, they should constantly conduct sanitary educational work among the personnel and persuasively show the pernicious influence of alcohol on the human organism. The analysis of the use by the servicemen of days off and leave also, in our view, requires a new approach. I would particularly like to mention sanatorium and resort treatment and rest. Many military health resorts in recent years have changed beyond recognition. At the same time, the demand for sanatorium and resort treatment is still not fully met. This problem is related not only to the sufficient number of places but also to the uneven load factor at the sanatoriums and vacation facilities during the year, often caused by the incorrect planning of leaves. At a number of health resorts, the physical plant does not correspond to today's requirements. There still are limited opportunities for family leave of the servicemen. During the current five-year plan, the efforts of the military medical service will be aimed at solving these problems.

A successful solution to the problems confronting us is inconceivable without a critical assessment of what has been done, a bold search and innovative ideas. A major contribution to the scientific elaboration of urgent problems of military medicine must be made by the scientists of the VMA [Military Medical Academy] imeni S. M. Kirov. We are rightly awaiting from them those forms and methods of disease prevention which would make it possible to maximally preserve and strengthen the health of the servicemen and prevent discharging from the army due to sickness.

In a word, today the military medical service is confronted with major tasks requiring a fundamental reorganization in the activities of each military medic.

Concern for the health of man.... This is one of the most important social tasks. To fully satisfy the needs of people for all types of highly skilled medical services and to fundamentally improve their quality -- this is the task presently set by the party for the public health workers. It is the duty of the military medics to make a worthy contribution to realizing these humane goals.

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ARMED FORCES

ECONOMIC, QUALITATIVE UTILITY OF INTRODUCING TRAINERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by Maj A. Dokuchayev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent from the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "The Right to an Experiment; The Economics of Combat Training"]

[Text] Not long ago, the representatives of the district staff visited the training signals battalion under the command of Lt Col G. Karpenko. In the course of a thorough inspection, it was noted with satisfaction that the training process had been clearly organized in the subunit, the exercises were held on a high procedural level and the young men were successfully mastering their military specialties. All of this was generally quite natural for the collective where training time is valued and where the officers and warrant officers [praporshchik] show a responsible attitude toward work with subordinates. All of this is indicative of our times where a decisive reorganization is required in work style and methods.

The district staff officers also learned that here in the last training year the periods between repairs for special vehicles were extended by 1.5-fold, 30 tons of gasoline were saved over the established consumption standards and the operating life of the communications equipment was saved. The figures for the battalion were impressive. But there were also doubts: can the training subjects not have been worked out fully? No, as a careful analysis showed, the training plan was fully carried out. The skill of the specialists and the savings were achieved by the skillful and intensive use of trainers and other training equipment.

The signals troop long ago set out to achieve the greatest possible savings of materiel in the course of training but did not become successful immediately. It was not immediately possible to overcome a certain timidity on the part of the platoon and company commanders who were the direct organizers of the training process in the area of the advisability of employing training equipment. There was a stereotype of thought based on old experience and one could feel a mistrust that sound skills in the signal troops could be learned using trainer equipment. The officers gravitated toward the old training methods using only the regulation equipment. In particular, Sr Lt M. Yeremenko showed that the established methods of training the specialists should not be changed. He backed up his position by saying that after using

trainer devices the telegraph operators would experience difficulties in operating the combat equipment.

The battalion commander reflected a good deal on how to overcome the established stereotype. He sought the advice of the deputy for political affairs, Maj L. Graf, and the chief of staff, Maj N. Yegorchatov. They decided to conduct an experiment: to show to the subunit commanders that using trainers it was possible to significantly improve the quality of specialist training as well as economize and save a great deal.

Soon thereafter modern trainer equipment appeared in the battalion for the training of radio telegraph operators. One platoon began training on equipment following the old path and the old methods. Another began to study using trainers. After 2 months, it was decided to hold test exercises and compare the results.

Lt Col G. Karpenko, a master of combat skills, and who at one time had carefully studied the capabilities of trainers and had mastered the methods of training the personnel using them, along with Capt A. Saliyenko compiled a training program and divided the men into groups considering their training level. The problems for the specialists were made more complex as they mastered the previous assignments.

Specialists from the platoon under the command of Sr Lt Yeremenko in parallel and with equal endeavor worked directly using the equipment. Then there was the test exercise at which the skills of the men would be judged by the best battalion specialists. This showed that the quality of receiving and transmitting radiograms was in no way lower in the subunit where they had trained on trainers. Doubts about the advisability of using trainer equipment were dispelled even among inveterate skeptics. Everyone began to use this equipment. But the battalion commander was already looking farther to the future. How could they organize in the battalion a competition for the efficient use of the trainer equipment? In what direction should the training facilities be improved? How could they increase the economicness of the training process? Certainly to limit themselves to just introducing the trainers would also mean to stop in one's growth, even at a higher level.

The verve of the search and the push forward were passed from the battalion commander to his subordinates. Then Sr Lt L. Lazarev and Sgt A. Selin proposed an increase in the number of programs for radio operator drills. They experimented and skills increased more rapidly. Sr Lt F. Zinatulin in addition to the trainers in a classroom using written-off equipment built an equipment room in which the men began to study by crews in a situation as close as possible to actual combat using simulators.

Certain problems also arose with the introduction of trainers. In particular, it was necessary to fundamentally improve the procedural skills of the officers. For these purposes, Col Karpenko began to use exercises in the commander training system as well as instructor-procedural and demonstration exercises. But this was not enough.

Also beneficial was the proposal made by the chief of staff, Maj Yegorchatov. He recommended using training maps in the exercises. Using these maps the soldiers and sergeants could train independently and monitor and evaluate their skills in operating the radio equipment.

The economic indicators of the battalion also rose with the improved quality of specialist skills brought about by the use of the trainers: motor life and fuel were saved. More tangible was the direct contribution of the men to implementing the party's present-day demands posed for the Soviet people for rationally consuming all types of resources and lowering their losses.

The questions of savings also began to be approached in an enterprising, creative and state-like manner in other units and subunits of the district. For example, in the tank regiment where Lt Col A. Arkhipov is the deputy commander for weapons, they so organized the training process for the drivers that each kilometer traveled by a combat or combat training vehicle was efficiently used. Here the equipment needed for the exercises was kept in a field park set up not far from the tank driving range. In addition, in traveling from the garrison to the training center, the troops crossed several obstacles and now, even overtaking the combat vehicles, the men improve their skills in driving the tank in crossing these obstacles and learn to drive in columns.

The same principle has been followed in moving to the tank moving target ranges and other training areas. It is no accident that at the final tank driving exercises last year the tank troops from this regiment showed sound skills in mastering the combat vehicles. And in this troop collective significantly less time and materiel is spent in the training process.

There are many ways for the high quality and economic training of the armed defenders of the motherland. These are discovered and used differently in each unit. But one thing is clear: success comes to those who show a creative search, who seek out reserves for accelerating and improving the quality of combat training and savings and who do not fear to experiment. An officer gains the right to experiment by his high professional training, erudition and desire to make his contribution to the common cause.

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ARMED FORCES

COL GEN YERMAKOV DISCUSSES IMPROVEMENT OF OFFICER TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by Col Gen V. Yermakov, Commander of the Central Group of Forces, delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress, under the rubric "The Commander and Modern Combat": "It Will Not Accept Routine"]

[Text] When one reads carefully the preCongress documents, one clearly senses in them the boldness of the party's plans, its demandingness in assessing what has been achieved and its emphasis on creativity and initiative in the work. Naturally, this motivates one to stress what has been achieved more severely, with party strictness, and to boldly adopt everything new and progressive.

Life has demonstrated that it is impossible to achieve success in anything today if one operates in the old manner, with obsolete ways and methods. The draft new edition of the CPSU Program stresses the fact that the party attaches fundamental importance to the uncompromising struggle against any sort of stagnation and conservatism and to the creative quest for modern solutions to social and economic, scientific and technical, and ideological and indoctrinational problems. This fully applies also to the military work, in which routine, inertia and stagnation are particularly intolerable. They retard the further enhancement of the combat readiness of the units and sub-units and have a negative effect upon the training of the fightingmen in modern methods and ways of combatting a powerful, tactically competent and well armed enemy.

Modern combat is dynamic and fast-moving. It is characterized by determined objectives, great maneuverability, rapid changes in the situation and the concentrated employment of equipment and weapons. This demands of the commanders and all of the officers, flexibility of thinking, creativity and initiative, and the ability to rapidly assess complex situations and to employ unconventional methods of accomplishing the missions, methods which will catch the enemy unawares and make it possible to take full advantage of the element of surprise.

These qualities are developed first of all in tactical drills and exercises. Is there any need to mention how much depends upon what they are like, upon their effectiveness, and how the adherence of certain commanders and staffs to routine sometimes hinders matters?

I recall a tactical exercise in which such deficiencies manifested themselves most acutely and graphically. Tanks of the battalion being led into the attack by Lieutenant Colonel V. Zinchenko appeared on the slope of a hill. Precisely deploying in extended line, the tankmen, interacting with motorized riflemen, rushed harmoniously toward the forward edge of the "enemy's" defense. Helicopters entered the battle.

Objective control data soon showed that the attackers had inflicted reliable fire damage upon the defenders at the first position. It seemed that a good evaluation was assured. After carefully analyzing the situation, however, we arrived at a different conclusion. The "secret" behind the attackers' accurate fire was due to the fact that the targets simulating "enemy" combat equipment and personnel were located at positions long known to the exercise participants. They had engaged in practice combat there not a few times. Naturally, they did not have to exert any effort to reconnoiter the targets and direct their fire....

The same sort of situation developed in the fighting in the depth. The "enemy" launched a counterattack on the battalion's right flank. In this situation as well, however, Lieutenant Colonel Zinchenko's men easily gained the upper hand. It turned out that they had repelled a counterattack from that same line in the past.

Naturally, the fallaciousness of this approach to the organization of exercises was acutely discussed in the critique. It was noted that this attitude toward the field training exists also in certain other units. Decisions are sometimes imposed upon the commanders being trained, the actions of the troops are of a linear nature, and little advantage is taken of the maneuverability of the subunits.

Modern combat is called a confrontation of minds, a struggle of intellects--and not without foundation. All else being equal, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov, USSR Minister of Defense, stressed, the greatest success in it will be achieved by that commander who is able to get his bearings in a situation rapidly and well, whose operational and tactical predictions are the most accurate and far-sighted and whose plans are the most realistic, the one who is capable of vigorously maneuvering the troops under his command and has a better knowledge of the enemy, of his weak and strong points, the one who rapidly informs his subordinates of his decision and sees to it that the decision is carried out.

Experience has shown that most of our commanders possess these qualities. I recall a tactical exercise directed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Bokarev, a regimental commander who was recently appointed to a higher position. He decisively departed from the rules and placed Major A. Dzhaylybayev, battalion commander, into a situation in which the latter was forced to operate in other than a standard manner and to count completely upon himself. During the training battle five groups of reserve targets were unexpectedly raised in front of the battalion, simulating an "enemy" counterattack. For a certain period of time this threw the attackers, who had just repelled a counterattack, into confusion. To Major Dzhaylybayev's credit, however, he rapidly coped with it, assessing the situation and precisely calculating the subunit's maneuver.

There were numerous such episodes in the exercise. Lieutenant Colonel Bokarev attempted to create a situation approaching combat reality and to give the trainees the most complete possible idea of the dynamics of modern combat, of what operations are like in a situation in which the "enemy" is using radio-electronic and other modern means of warfare. The exercise thus helped to develop flexible tactical thinking and a creative, nonroutine attitude toward the organization of combat. Let us stress the fact that the subunit achieved good results also in the execution of the fire missions. And what is important is that concern for destroying the targets did not shove tactics, which have the chief role, into the background as sometimes happens.

When the exercise was summed up, however, one could still hear statements like the following: If the regimental commander had "experimented" less and not placed the battalion commander and his men into unaccustomed situations, the subunit could have received a higher evaluation. I believe that this is nothing other than an echo of that faulty practice whereby the number of "holes" in the targets was the main consideration for evaluating the performance of subunits in an exercise. One encounters this approach less and less frequently. The criteria of real combat training and an understanding of the fact that an exercise conducted under simplified conditions is wasted time and resources are moving more and more noticeably to the fore.

There is a large range of means for encouraging an officer to reject routine. The ability of the exercise director to put the trainees into the proper situation unquestionably has the leading role. Specifically, into situations which prevent them from operating according to versions they already know. There is a great deal to be learned in this respect from the Guards Motorized Rifle Irkutsk-Pinsk Division imeni RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Its tactical fields for preparing personnel to operate in mountainous and forest terrain and the serious manner in which the exercise directors regard the creation of a different complex situation every time make it possible to train the personnel in accordance with the demands of modern combat. The "enemy" in front of the trainees is not a passive observer but an energetic and skillfully organized force. This is achieved by making the situation in the exercises successively more complicated, with the extensive employment of special tactical problems which demand efficient and flexible thinking from the officers, diversity of simulation equipment and the target situation, and proper equipment of the training ground. Reserves for improving the field training lie precisely here.

Certain commanders, however, complain that it is not an easy matter to create a different tactical situation every time on a training ground which is well known to the trainees. This is an attempt to justify their own inaction and inertia. There are certain difficulties, of course. The borders of the training ground cannot be expanded at will. However, I believe that the commander and exercise organizer with initiative will find a way even on a familiar training ground to put his men under conditions which will differ fundamentally from previous ones and force them to exert both their strength and their minds. No one designated a new section of terrain for Lieutenant Colonel Bokarev, for example. He organized the exercise on a familiar training ground. He still succeeded in complicating the situation with unexpected hypothetical problems, however, with skillful, well thought out use of the terrain. And so it is not so much a matter of external circumstances as of

the commander's thinking, his qualities as an organizer, his ability to fill up an exercise with specific practical substance, striving for a high level of combat intensity.

Good ideological conditioning and professional competence, including the officer's technical military sophistication, are unquestionably extremely important prerequisites for developing flexible tactical thinking in him. This is why primarily the further improvement of commander training is regarded as the way to develop creativity and initiative in the commanders. Under the existing practices approximately half of the time allocated for commander training is designated for improving the officers' tactical training. This is where there would appear to be reserves for teaching commanders the art of organizing and conducting combat. But how are these reserves sometimes utilized?

Staff officers in the group of forces recently studied this matter in a tank regiment in which one of the battalions is commanded by Captain M. Biryukov. It was found that the commander training there is primarily theoretical. During the classes the officers are frequently merely an audience. Just what sort of return can there be from a short TEWT or training exercise, as an example, if they are conducted in a routine manner, according to an accustomed plan, if the officer's mind operates only on "receive" and does not struggle to determine the optimal actions for the specific situation.

Improving the professional training of the officers is the key task involved in the combat training of the forces, of course. With this in mind, the staff of the group of forces is intensifying its monitoring of the quality of the commander training and implementation of the principle: "The chief teaches the subordinate." The focus is being switched to working out questions at the practical level on the terrain. We are attempting to make all of the work in organizing combat more concrete and to eliminate formalism and generalized reasoning. We are orienting people toward making fuller use of the outstanding officers' experience in the commander training. Among other things, this experience teaches one intolerance of all indulgences and simplifications. We are striving to see that the socialist competition focuses more specifically on enhancing the tactical skill of the officers, improving their skills as commanders and developing creativity and initiative in them.

Establishing a creative attitude toward the work and an innovative approach to the accomplishment of the assigned missions constitutes one of the most important requirements for the reorganization being implemented by the party in all areas of our life. As applicable to the military cadres this means, among other things, that we must increase our attention to the development of initiative and creativity and reject standardization and routine in the tactical training and in the work of developing in the commanders those qualities which are essential to the organizers of combat.

The political organs and party organizations, which are expected to establish a climate of creative quest and dissatisfaction with what has been achieved in every military collective, unquestionably have an extremely important role in this. A great deal was done in this area during preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress and the discussion of pre-congress documents. However, we regard

what has been done as only the beginning of that large job which has to be accomplished in accordance with the demands of the times. Times of bold decisions and bold actions.

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ARMED FORCES

INTERVIEW WITH CADRES CHIEF, ARMY GEN SHKADOV

Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 7, 1986 p 12

[NEDELYA interview with Army Gen I.N. Shkadov, Deputy USSR Minister of Defense, Hero of the Soviet Union, delegate to the 27th CPSU Congress, by V. Vodolazhskiy and M. Zemskov: "The Officers"]

[Text] Our people refer to the Soviet officers as people of heroic destiny. They are members of a profession with a mission which is defined briefly and clearly: To protect the homeland.

Our officer corps was the subject of an interview conducted with Ivan Nikolayevich Shkadov by NEDELYA correspondents on the eve of the 68th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy.

"The biographies of today's officers," Ivan Nikolayevich began the conversation, "have many things in common. School, the Komsomol and as a rule, training at a military school. Many of them also have an academy behind them. The older generation traveled the fiery roads of the Great Patriotic. This was my fate. I entered the Gorkiy Armored School imeni I.V. Stalin in 1935 at the recommendation of the Nelidovskiy Rayon Komsomol Committee. I graduated 3 years later. The years of studying the military sciences and the officer's profession left beautiful memories for life.

"After that everything was the same as for most of my peers, those who became commanders during the troubled '30s: Participation in the fighting at Lake Khasan, the Great Patriotic (I defended and attacked at Moscow and Stalingrad, fought the fascists in the Ukraine and Moldavia, in Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia).

"The youthful, 'beardless' commanders and political instructors (the concept 'officers' was first introduced in the Armed Forces of the USSR in 1943 by an ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet) of Great Patriotic times have long since become the 'elders' of our officer corps, but one will never forget that they are the ones who set examples of courage, valor and steadfastness, always and everywhere. Around 7,500 of the 11,600 Heroes of the Soviet Union who were awarded this title for feats performed during the war were officers."

[Question] What features are most typical of today's officer? What does his collective portrait resemble, for example?

[Answer] The main thing is that officers of the '80s are the direct continuers of the traditions of the heroes of Perekop and Kakhovka, the defenders of Moscow and participants in the storming of Berlin. Like their fathers and grandfathers, they are infinitely devoted to the homeland and the Communist Party, possess good ideological and moral qualities and are valorous, courageous and resolute. In addition, however, they also have greater military knowledge and erudition and an extensive technical perspective. The officers (and I want to particularly stress this) are people with a well-rounded education, with great spiritual needs. They devote their leisure time to the theater, to aesthetic creativity, art, sports....

A few more characteristic details. In our officer corps are represented more than 100 of the country's nationalities and ethnic groups: members of the families of workers, kolkhoz workers, the Soviet intelligentsia. More than 90 percent of them are Communists or Komsomol members.

[Question] Fifteen years ago NEDELYA correspondents conducted an interview on approximately the same subject with General A. Altunin, then Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. At that time he said, among other things, that the military technical revolution is making new and greater demands of the moral qualities and fighting efficiency of the military man and constantly promoting their development. And if we compare today's officer corps with that which existed a decade and a half ago, let us say, would there also be some changes?

[Answer] A period of 15-20 years is not such a short one in our rapidly developing century. The new weapons and combat equipment with which the forces are outfitted today and the continuing development of military art have complicated the missions performed by the officers and expanded the range of their duties. Nor can we ignore the fact that the general educational level of the draft-age youth has risen drastically in recent years, and they have become far more informed. The level of the officers' political and professional training has risen as a result.

[Question] Incidentally, what is the educational level of the officers today?

[Answer] More than 70 percent of the officers have a higher military or specialized military education. Practically all of the commanders of regiments, brigades and higher, and the chiefs of political organs have a higher military education. Many of the officers have scientific degrees and titles.

[Question] Let us make that question a little more specific. What kind of knowledge do they have when they graduate from a higher combined-arms military school?

[Answer] The young lieutenant receives a higher specialized military education and the skills of an engineer corresponding to the specific branch of troops. In addition to all this, the young man knows how to operate a combat vehicle and to fire various types of weapons, and has a sports rating.

Today's young officer must have good moral qualities and fighting efficiency.

[Question] What does that involve?

[Answer] In military terms, this is a group of closely related and complementary features in the individual, features which are essential for the serviceman to fulfill his duties in peacetime and in time of war. The main ones are loyalty to the homeland, to military duty and the oath, discipline....

[Question] Ivan Nikolayevich, one frequently hears the expression "military character." What features are inherent in this character?

[Answer] Military character is first of all strong-willed. I am convinced that it is strong will which comprises the basis of all the other qualities of the military man: discipline, demandingness of oneself and one's subordinates, and personal bravery. Only the strong-willed individual (incidentally, these qualities can be developed and cultivated) can independently direct personnel in any situation, including the most extreme situation. Like Captain Lieutenant B. Polyakov, a submariner, for example. An exceptionally complicated situation once developed in one of the submarine compartments during a cruise. Polyakov assumed command, and for more than 20 days, in a situation of complete isolation, darkness, cold and gale winds, he inspired (in the full sense of the word) the submariners to work selflessly to save the ship.

Cadet Yu. Kokushkin, a cadet at the Chernigov Higher Military Air School for Pilots imeni Lenin Komsomol also has military character. He refused to abandon a supersonic fighter with a malfunction over a populated area. He demonstrated character and succeeded in landing the plummeting aircraft in a corn field far from the settlement. People and military equipment were saved.

[Question] Can any young man become an officer? What does this require?

[Answer] In principle, any worker, kolkhoz worker, secondary school graduate, soldier or officer with a secondary education and... good health for sure, can enter a military school or institute.

It is perfectly natural that people are carefully selected for the military school. Their public activeness, the state of their health and their physical condition, as well as the level of their general education within the framework of the secondary school programs, are taken into account.

Furthermore, young people selecting a military career must themselves carefully think over this move. It is important that their desire to devote their life to the military service be consistent with their objective capabilities.

[Question] Tell me, do the young people gladly enter the schools?

[Answer] First, let me cite some lines from a letter we received in the Ministry of Defense: "I will complete a 10-year school this year," writes Yevgeniy Serikov from Kazan. "We are arguing about where I should go to

study, of course. It is difficult to choose the best and the most interesting profession. One can boldly name defending the homeland as the most needed profession, however. And so I decided for myself long ago that I shall be an officer."

The youth's desire to enter military VUZs has increased markedly today. In the competition for admission to many of them, three to five individuals compete for one opening.

This is gratifying. It is good when the youth recognize their responsibility for the fate of the nation when they are just starting out.

[Question] You have met commanders who serve in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, of course. How are they performing on their combat exam and fulfilling their military and international duty?

[Answer] With dignity and honor, as befits Soviet officers! Suffice it to say that hundreds of them have been awarded orders and medals, and some of them have received the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

[Question] Under the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, graduates of VUZs and secondary specialized educational institutions who already have officer ranks are now being drafted into the army and navy. What can you say about them?

[Answer] As a rule, they fulfill their constitutional duty well. Under the guidance of experienced commanders and political workers, reserve officers drafted into the Armed Forces for 2 or 3 years master the military profession and become highly rated specialists within a relatively short period of time. And you know, many of them then express a desire to remain as regulars in the Armed Forces.

[Question] And now let me ask this. You have already stated that many officers already have a higher education diploma when they begin their service. What role have the academies begun to play?

[Answer] The same as in the past. This should be clarified. Upon completing a military school the officer receives a diploma indicating that he has a higher specialized military education. This permits him to command subunits and conduct party-political work in them. The academy provides a higher military education and prepares the officer who has already developed and received experience in the forces to command a military unit, a ship or a formation and to work on the staffs.

[Question] We know that there are real officer dynasties in the Soviet Armed Forces. Could you name a few of them?

[Answer] Yes, we have families members of which have devoted their life to the officer's career for several generations. The name of Vice Admiral A. Petelin, submariner and Hero of the Soviet Union, is well known in the navy.

Son of a Ural worker, he joined the navy with Komsomol authorization in the '30s. He sailed on the most diverse classes of submarines. In 1962 he commanded the nuclear-powered submarine Leninskiy Komsomol and carried out a cruise beneath the ice at the North Pole. The father's work is being continued by his son, Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Petelin, also a submariner in the Red Banner Northern Fleet. Aleksandr Ivanovich's grandson Pavel has also taken the path of a sailor. He is a cadet at a naval school for submarine navigation....

[Question] Comrade Army General, the next question is of a somewhat different nature. During your lifetime you have no doubt seen many movies, television films and plays about officers. Do you like them? Do they accurately depict the officer's life?

[Answer] For one thing, I think that there are simply too few of them. In the second place, I would like to see films and plays about the contemporary officer. I could not name a modern film or play which would make the same profound impression and leave the same mark on one's mind and heart as the movie "Chapayev" did in its time.

[Question] I have heard that our officer corps has grown younger in recent years....

[Answer] This is perfectly natural. The army must always be young! The Great Patriotic experience confirms this. At that time the bulk of our officer corps was made up of youth, 85.6 percent of which were no older than 35 years. The young officers persistently mastered military art and successfully commanded units, formations and forces. General I.D. Chernyakhovskiy assumed command of a front at the age of 38. Rear Admiral A.G. Golovko, commander of the Northern Fleet, turned 35 on the second day of the war.

...Military affairs have come a long way since then, making maximum demands of the officers. Most of the physical and moral-psychological load falls on them. We take this into account in the training, the selection and placement of cadres. At the same time, we have careful regard for the experienced, meritorious veterans of the Armed Forces. We always remember that they are the bearers of the extremely important combat experience.

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ARMED FORCES

COL GEN GONCHAROV DISCUSSES NEW DECREE ON WARRANT OFFICERS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 1, Jan 86 pp 10-11

[Article by Col Gen V.A. Goncharov, First Deputy Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense: "On the Service of Shore-Based and Seagoing Warrant Officers"]

[Text] The draft new edition of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union states the following: "Every communist and every Soviet individual is obligated to do everything within his power to maintain the nation's defense capability at the proper level."

The large group of shore-based and seagoing warrant officers of the Soviet Armed Forces is assigned a large place in the accomplishment of this important task.

The party and the government demonstrate constant concern for creating the best possible conditions for the warrant officers' fulfillment of their military duty. This concern is clearly expressed in the Statute on the Performance of Military Service by Seagoing and Shore-Based Warrant Officers of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Decisions adopted by our party and government have increased the rights and privileges extended to seagoing and shore-based warrant officers. They are directed toward further strengthening the combat readiness of the army and navy and enhancing the role and authority of the officers' closest assistants.

This document contains a number of significant points. The group of servicemen who can be awarded the ranks "senior seagoing warrant officer" and "senior shore-based warrant officer" has been increased considerably, for example. There are provisions for awarding these ranks, regardless of the position held, for good moral qualities and fighting efficiency demonstrated in the defense of the USSR and the fulfillment of international duty, for irreproachable service in the rank of seagoing or shore-based warrant officer for a continuous period of 15 years, and for the exemplary performance of alert duty.

Individuals beginning active military duty as seagoing or shore-based warrant officers voluntarily accept the commitment to perform their military service not in a specific military unit but in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Servicemen who have been deprived of the military ranks of "seagoing warrant officer" or "shore-based warrant officer" but who have subsequently demonstrated themselves to be worthy to hold positions as the closest assistants of officers, may be granted their former military rank by order of the commander of a military district, an equivalent or higher commander at the recommendation of military commissariats.

Senior seagoing and shore-based warrant officers may be reduced one level in rank as a disciplinary measure under the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Such servicemen can be restored to their rank at the end of the period defined in the Code.

The advancement of seagoing and shore-based warrant officers within a military unit, one which is not linked to organizational measures, assignment for training or discharge from active military duty, must now be effected after the winter or summer training period has ended.

Authority to advance this category of servicemen in special situations of service need is granted to commanders of military districts or fleets, to their equivalents and higher commanders.

Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers may be transferred from the Soviet Army and Navy, with their consent, to the State Security Committee of the USSR or to the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

The Decree assigns great importance to the rating of seagoing and shore-based warrant officers. Chiefs charged with rating their subordinates will at least once every 5 years render personal accountability for the objectiveness of the ratings and the validity of the conclusions and recommendations contained in them. The approved ratings will be announced to the servicemen by their immediate chiefs. A complaint about a violation of the rating procedure or about nonobjective conclusions may be submitted no later than 1 month from the date the document is made known. The chief who approved the rating makes the final decision on the complaint. If he deems the complaint to be valid, he must make the appropriate changes in the rating.

The Decree strictly regulates the leave procedure. Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers on active military duty are now granted additional leave as established by decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers, and women (seagoing and shore-based warrant officers) are granted pregnancy and maternity leaves and leave time to care for a child until it reaches the age of 1 and 1/2 years.

Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers who have served 25 calendar years or more in the Armed Forces of the USSR are granted regular leaves of 45 days.

Individuals who have served on active duty in Irkutsk Oblast, in the Tuva ASSR, in individual locations in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, as well as in certain rayons, in high-mountain locations (at altitudes of 1500 meters or more), or Soviet forces temporarily stationed abroad, where families are not authorized to join them also have the right to a regular leave of 45 days.

Seagoing and shore-based warrant officers serving on the territories of the Far East and Transbaykal Military Districts and the Pacific Fleet, as well as in areas of the Far North and equivalent localities, are permitted if they so desire to accumulate their regular leave for 2 years. The total accumulated leave must not exceed 3 months, however (including travel time). If these individuals are transferred to different localities, their unutilized accumulated leave for the preceding and current years is granted to them at their new station.

In case of service need, at the new station the accumulated leave may be granted in two periods within the limits of the combined leave time, with travel papers issued each time.

Sea going and shore-based warrant officers serving at remote localities in the USSR for which they are paid one and a half times or double their established salary may, at their desire, be paid monetary compensation for unutilized leave time by the procedure established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

Female seagoing and shore-based warrant officers are granted pregnancy and maternity leave with pay and allowances and, with a length of service of at least 1 year, partially paid leave to care for the child (without pay and allowances) for the length of time and by the procedure established under present laws.

In addition to this kind of leaves, at the woman's request, additional leave time is granted without pay and allowances to care for the child until it reaches the age of 1 and 1/2 years. This leave time is included in length of continuous service.

Pregnancy and maternity leave time is not listed as regular leave. Regular leave for the current year is granted before pregnancy and maternity leave is taken or immediately afterward.

When there are particularly valid grounds involving factors preventing female seagoing (or shore-based) warrant officers from performing their military duty (with no other grounds for discharge) may be discharged from active military duty for family reasons. Women may be given an early discharge at their request or by decision of the command element on these same grounds due to the birth of a child when it is impossible to continue performing their service duties in the position they hold.

The additional benefits granted to seagoing and shore-based warrant officers also impose greater responsibility upon them. Because of this, for servicemen who fail to show up for duty without valid reasons, the regular leave is reduced by the number of days they are AWOL. (Their regular leave must not be less than 15 days, however.)

The Decree especially singles out the rights and duties of the officers' closest assistants. Among other things, it states that seagoing and shore-based warrant officers are required everywhere and always to value the honor and the combat glory of the Armed Forces of the USSR and their own military honor, to protect the honor and dignity of the military rank, to strictly

observe the laws, the military oath and military regulations, and communist moral standards, and to protect state and public property. They must be vigilant and strictly protect military and state secrets.

The party and the government put great trust in this category of servicemen and hope that the seagoing and shore-based warrant officers will in turn spare neither energy nor effort to justify this trust and contribute what they can to the strengthening of the Soviet state's defense capability.

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

OFFICERS' WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH SERGEANTS EXAMINED

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Feb 86 p 2

[Article by Lt Col R. Umryakov, deputy commander for political affairs of an air defense missile unit in the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "To Teach and Demand; Notes on Work With the Sergeants"]

[Text] The antiaircraft missile battalion under the command of Lt Col Ya. Barnyak for more than 10 years has had the title of outstanding. The field firings by the battalion have been graded, as a rule, with a high number of points. Here everyone who should have a class rating and a majority are specialists 1st and 2d class and outstanding men. It is worthy of note that among the sergeants these indicators are even higher. Every sergeant, for example, has mastered two or three related specialties. Many junior commanders, when necessary, can take over in combat work for the officers. Such training for the sergeant personnel is one of the most important factors for the battalion's success. In realizing this, the commander and his deputies, in relying on the party and Komsomol organizations, have carried out constant, painstaking work with the junior commanders. The sergeants are taught the art of indoctrinating and training their subordinates. This is caused by life itself and the growing demands on the combat skills of the personnel.

I recall, how once the battery commanded by Capt N. Savelyev was feverishly at work. The battery commander himself was a conscientious officer and worked hard for the common good. However, he tried to do everything himself. In working in one place at the same time a problem arose at another. At the same time his assistants, particularly the sergeants, remained on the sidelines in resolving important problems.

In the battalion under discussion they now recall with ironic smiles those times and their previous views on the role of the sergeants. At present in their predominant majority the subunit sergeants are strong-willed, exacting junior commanders on whom one can always rely. These are primarily Sgt L. Metelev and Jr Sgts V. Rybakov and A. Vidov. Of course, they did not get this way immediately.

Once Vidov's subordinate, Pvt A. Dzharulayev, had an altercation with the subunit's duty officer. Vidov limited himself to informing the battery commander, Capt N. Smirnov, of his subordinate's misdeed.

"But what did you personally do?" came the question.

"What do you mean?" the junior sergeant looked at the battery commander in perplexity.

"What did you do as the immediate chief of Dzharulayev?" the officer questioned.

"Nothing," said Jr Sgt Vidov, shrugging his shoulders. "I have few rights."

You could feel that the junior sergeant did not fully understand his duties and did not see any other means of influencing his subordinates except reprimands. He felt that the stricter the reprimand, the more effective it was. For this reason each time he turned to the officers with a request to apply the rights granted him.

Undoubtedly, Capt Smirnov was also to blame here. Several times, without thinking, he took over for Vidov and other sergeants in the sense of disciplinary practices. This, of course, did not contribute to establishing the authority of the junior commander.

"You have sufficient rights," the battery commander told Vidov that time. "It is essential to use them skillfully. Go and give some thought to how you should have proceeded with Pvt Dzharulayev. Report to me on your decision."

Thus Jr Sgt Vidov was confronted with the necessity of showing independence. Actually from this episode started his development as a junior commander. Realizing that now no one would perform his duties for him, he began to show a more exacting attitude toward his subordinates and be more closely concerned with their indoctrination.

In the unit one frequently hears various judgments about the sergeants who are the subordinates of Officer Ya. Barnyak. For example: it is easy for Barnyak to work as he has good sergeants. In truth, they are good. But they did not become thus by themselves. Simply here they are concerned with them. The subunit officers have always known well the training level of the sergeants, and the degree of development of the volitional qualities and organizational abilities of each of them. This provides an opportunity to conduct more specific indoctrination and prevent all sorts of mistakes by the sergeants. Here it has become traditional to hold meetings of the junior commanders where they sum up their activities and analyze non-standard instances from their indoctrinational practices. This enriches their knowledge, experience and ultimately helps to raise the role of the sergeants in maintaining proper order.

"Teach and demand -- this is our basic principle in terms of the sergeants," said Officer Barnyak.

Unfortunately, among certain officers it is the opinion that the sergeants are supposedly not what they should be. They cannot be entrusted with carrying out an important job. Moreover, the specific nature of the air defense subunit is supposedly such that the sergeants work on the equipment along with the soldiers in the role of ordinary specialists and for this reason it is somehow hard to isolate them in the mass of soldiers as commanders. But does it reduce the authority of a sergeant if he works together with his subordinates? No, of course it doesn't. The problem is somewhere else. Simply some officers do not trust the sergeants.

Take the antiaircraft missile subunit commanded by Maj A. Kuznetsov. In the collective there are not so few sergeants but their role has been clearly played down. The reason is that the junior commanders are taken over for, as they say, at every step. Just one example: many orders are given to the soldiers in bypassing their immediate superiors, the sergeants. This is explained by the fact that in this way the instructions reach the executors faster. But experience teaches us that much more harm comes from such a practice than good.

Many of us, probably, have repeatedly witnessed how a job which should be performed by a sergeant is assigned to an officer. An officer heads a group of soldiers serving combat equipment. He is appointed in charge also in carrying out various administrative jobs. The officers lead the subunits to the bathhouse, they are appointed duty officers for the mess and "responsible" for the subunits. That is, they perform the duties which could easily be handled by any of the junior commanders. However, once I even happened to become acquainted with draft instructions to the "responsible" officer for a subunit, where they had conscientiously copied the duties of the company duty officer from the Internal Service Regulations. As a result of such taking over, the sergeants gradually ceased feeling themselves to be commanders and are not concerned with the indoctrination and training of subordinates.

There is also an extreme of another sort. Certain officers feel that the sergeants should arrive from the training subunits fully trained in all regards and for this reason are not concerned with their development and do not provide them with help. At the same time, life teaches that in order for a sergeant to feel confident in his new position after the training subunit, he must have some time. During this period the young sergeant greatly needs the help and attention of the officers, their confidence and at the same time just exactingness.

Jr Sgt V. Rybakov arrived from the training subunit in the battalion as a well-trained specialist. But he did not have enough experience in working with others. At one moment he dressed down a subordinate for some minor detail. At another he did not pay attention to a serious infraction of military discipline. Capt V. Savelyev, Sgt A. Morozov and the other officers and sergeants had to work a good deal with Rybakov. Their talks about the responsibility of a junior commander and the ability to organize relationships with the men, their daily help and exactingness left a mark. Jr Sgt Rybakov now is on the correct path. There is no doubt that he will make a good commanders.

As can be seen from the given examples, we give a good deal of attention to the indoctrination of the sergeants. But it must be recognized that here not everything is going smoothly. It happens that one or another sergeant does not justify the trust given. Frequently this happens with those junior commanders whom we already considered sufficiently trained. Precisely they, at times, fall out of the view of the officers.

This, in particular, happened with Sgt S. Khuseinov. At first, he proved to be conscientious and exacting. Due to support from the officers he rapidly settled into the subunit. Soon thereafter he was appointed the battalion's master sergeant. And then Khuseinov took it into his mind that now everything was permitted to him. Benefiting from the lack of control, he began to deceive the commanders and violate the regulations. He had to be relieved of his master sergeant position. This instance was a lamentable exception. But it does lead one to the idea that in our work with the sergeants there are still many unutilized opportunities. And this obliges us to show greater principledness in the training and indoctrination of the junior commanders. To increase their role means to more effectively influence the personnel.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

BRIEFS

CONSTRUCTION TROOPS' COMPETITION RESULTS -- The results have been summed up for the all-Union socialist competition among the construction organizations and enterprises of the construction industry of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the fourth quarter of 1985. The Challenge Red Banners of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Central Committee of the Trade Union for Workers in Construction and the Building Materials Industry and the first monetary prizes were awarded to collectives of construction administrations of the Northern Fleet and the Moscow Air Defense District and to the collectives of construction organizations led by Comrades A. Bedrin, E. Borisov, V. Dolbnya, B. Dolgikh, F. Zheberlyayev, I. Zinchenko, A. Ivanov, F. Kapure, L. Lapshin, M. Makerov, Yu. Nenakhov and R. Sokolovskiy and to the collectives of the enterprises where Comrades M. Volkov, I. Daurov, V. Katsyuruba, S. Lekhovitskiy, A. Nekrasov, S. Puzyrev and B. Flerov are the chiefs. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 86 p 1] 10272

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

BRIEFS

FRUNZE AVIATION SCHOOL GRADUATION NOTED--The 10th, anniversary graduation will take place soon at the Frunze Aviation Technicians School. More than 170 people with the diploma of an aviation technician will disperse throughout the Soviet Union, while some of the graduates, envoys from fraternal Cambodia and Mongolia, will return to their homelands as highly skilled specialists. People who have received a diploma at the school are at work in lands other than these, however. They are in Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar. In 1984 the school itself took first place in the socialist competition among the nation's related educational institutions. It is the holder of Kirghizia's Lenin Komsomol Prize. [Text] [Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 22 Jan 86 p 2] 11499

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA ON U.S. PLANNING FOR, USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Feb 86 p 4

[Article by O. Georgiyev: "Why There is no Stopping the Slanderers: The USA Continues Preparations For a Chemical War Under a Propaganda Fuss"]

[Text] The world press reports that the Pentagon has launched large-scale testing of chemical weapons in Honduras. American Air Force planes are spraying highly-toxic substances over the territory of Cortes Department at night, substances which cause serious burns to human skin and powerful general poisoning of the organism. Judging from the initial symptoms of the poisoning, these are modern versions of those toxic substances which the United States used during the "dirty war" in Indochina.

The Pentagon is attempting to cover up its sinister experiments by slandering other states, as it has more than once in the past. And now the U.S. propaganda services have released to play over the world a false document stating that the Sandanistas in Nicaragua are "using chemical weapons against the contras." In precisely the same way, attempting to cover its tracks and shift responsibility onto others for the use of toxic substances in Indochina, the USA whipped up to its utmost the myth of "Soviet-made chemical weapons," which it alleged were being used in Cambodia. The new American falsified document brings to memory also the fact that while supplying the Afghan dushmans with chemical ammunition, the American secret services attempted to blame the Soviet Union for the use of that barbarian weapons.

Judging from everything, the newly hatched American falsified document on "the use of chemical weapons by the Sandanistas in Nicaragua" has a more far-reaching objective. The Soviet program for freeing the planet of all types of weapons of mass destruction, which was described in the 15 January 1986 Statement of CPSU CC General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev apparently took Washington by surprise. Let us recall that a specific response has still not been made to that Statement's proposals for a global and all-embracing ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of both all their stockpiles and production capacities for producing them.

With respect to the proposal to achieve as an interim step agreement not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone whatsoever and not to deploy them on the territories of other states, certain highly placed figures in the USA have already hastened to express their openly negative attitude toward it. The

American representative at the Geneva Disarmament Conference stated frankly, for example, that "the USA is against concluding an agreement on the nonproliferation of chemical weapons," since, he said, such an agreement would take attention away from the development of an all-embracing agreement on chemical weapons and would "harm the legal world trade in chemicals." Reports from Honduras convincingly demonstrate why Washington is against such an agreement: It is afraid it will be deprived of testing grounds for new toxic substances.

With respect to the universal banning of chemical weapons, there is still no sign that Washington is prepared for the thorough resolution of this problem. The Pentagon has not just launched preparations for the direct production of binary chemical weapons. It is attempting with ever increasing vigor to draw its NATO allies into the implementation of its sinister plans. At a recent meeting of NATO's Permanent Military Committee, for example, a plan for modernizing the North Atlantic bloc's chemical arsenal was approved under American pressure. Among other things, the committee not only recognized the "need" for such modernization, but also defined the conditions under which American binary weapons would be deployed in Western Europe. The committee instructed its working agencies to work out in detail questions pertaining to the transportation and storage of chemical ammunition. Furthermore, the NATO agencies were instructed to work out also the procedure for issuing the order for the combat employment of chemical weapons! It is not difficult to imagine what such an order would mean for millions and millions of peaceful residents on the continent of Europe.

The facts show that militaristic circles in the West, primarily the USA, are not halting for a single day their large-scale preparations for a chemical war. This is indicated by both the Pentagon's experts in Honduras and decisions of the NATO strategists. They are resorting to low-class slander in an attempt to evade responsibility for these actions.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

NEW FRENCH MISSILE SUBMARINE -- According to an announcement in the journal DEFENSE AND ARMAMENT, the French Navy has commissioned its sixth nuclear missile submarine of the Le Redoutable class, named the l'Inflexible. In contrast to the preceding five subs, each carrying 16 M20, two-stage solid fuel ballistic missiles with a single nuclear warhead and a range of 3,200 km, the Inflexible is armed with M4 three-stage missiles. They have a separating warhead with six warheads and a range up to 4,000 km. The sub is also equipped with a system in which for expelling the missile from the launching silo, instead of compressed gas, steam is used and the first-stage engine is fired under water and not above the surface as in the M20. In stressing that the Inflexible alone carries more nuclear charges than all the remaining French nuclear subs, the weekly JANE'S DEFENSE has announced the intention of the French military-political leadership to continue the policy of rearmament and in 1994 to commission the first submarine of a series armed with M5 missiles with a range of around 6,000 km. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Feb 86 p 3] 10272

CSO: 1801/118

SOVIET KALMYK HELICOPTER PILOT'S EXPERIENCES IN DRA

Moscow GRAZHDANSKAYA AVIYATSIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 86 pp 28-29

[Report by Col Ye. Besschetnov, member of the USSR Union of Journalists: I Am Attacking the Target"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Nikolayevich Ochirov is one of those who are continuing the glorious traditions of the older generation of Soviet military pilots and holding high the banner of loyal service to the Soviet homeland today. He is barely 30 years old, but the young officer already has a great deal of life's schooling and military feats behind him. He has been awarded combat orders, including the homeland's highest award, the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. The most brilliant page in Lieutenant Colonel Ochirov's biography is his service as part of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. He has twice helped to fulfill the international duty in that nation. And on every flight he has demonstrated great professional skill, boldness and resourcefulness in the performance of the missions.

The group of helicopters led by Ochirov flew low over the sun-scorched earth, holding a course toward the community of Kara-Bagi. It had been attacked by a band of dushmany (bandits). The local self-defense detachment and the district party aktiv had been forced to withdraw to the fortress. The siege had lasted several hours, ammunition was running out, and aid was needed for the wounded.

Foreseeing possible counteraction in the form of fire from the bandits, Ochirov flew his Mi to the east when approaching the fortress. He ordered Captain Yevgeniy Sukhov, commander of the second helicopter, to make the approach to the west, and ordered the pair of Mi-8s with the cargo to fly directly to the fortress.

Orange-colored flashes appeared here and there in the dusk among the ruins of the village, as though from electric welders. Ochirov understood that the dushmany had opened long-range fire on the helicopters. The crews of the combat helicopters suppressed the bandits' fire. The Mi-8s descended and dropped the cargo they had brought to the besieged in the fortress.

The self-defense detachment and the party aktiv repelled the bandits' attack and then drove them back. Lieutenant Colonel V. Ochirov, Communist and commander of the helicopter squadron, deserved a certain amount of the credit, of course. He had set a personal example of persistence, initiative and selflessness in the

execution of the mission. The secretary of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] provincial committee thanked the Soviet airmen for their assistance.

International duty.... This concept has a specific meaning for every Soviet fightingman. Valeriy Nikolayevich puts something of his own, something special, into it. His father is a Kalmyk, his mother a Russian. But he was born far from Kalmykiya, in Kzyl-Orda Oblast in Kazakh territory. His childhood friends were the children of Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Greeks, Koreans....

Brought up from his early years in a spirit of fraternal love and respect for other peoples, Valeriy Ochirov, who became a combat helicopter pilot upon graduating from a military aviation school, accepted as a mandate from his own heart the mission of providing international assistance to Afghanistan's working people in the defense of the gains of the April revolution. During his first tour there in 1980-1981, he was awarded the Order of the Red Star and the Afghan "Military Valor" medal, and during his second tour in 1984-1985, the Order of Lenin and the Hero's Gold Star medal.

As commander of the helicopter squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Ochirov united round him a strong combat collective capable of successfully executing the complex missions involved in providing international assistance to the people of the friendly nation.

The Soviet airmen were once visited at the airfield by Mirabdullo, in charge of the PDPA provincial committee, and Mirzakhan, a worker with the provincial security agencies. They told the commander and his deputies about the increased frequency of raids by terrorists against peaceful settlements and about a band led by a certain Asladdin, which was committing robbery and murders against the peaceful population.

That day Lieutenant Colonel V. Ochirov was directing flights from the control tower. Around 20 minutes after takeoff, Captain Anatoliy Gorelikov, flying as a member of a team, reported by radio that a small caravan had emerged from a nearby village: "Camels and horses loaded with belongings; and women, old people and children alongside them. Apparently a peaceful caravan...."

V. Ochirov ordered A. Gorelikov to descend and visually ascertain what sort of caravan it actually was. He then sent up a pair of Mi-8s with landing forces on board. The helicopter pilots flew over the caravan and attempted to halt it with a prearranged signal. They did not succeed, however. Nor did a second attempt produce any results. It was only about 1 kilometer to the next village.

When the pair of Mi-8s carrying the landing forces appeared on the horizon, two individuals separated from the caravan and took to their heels. One of them turned and fired a long burst of submachine gun fire at the helicopters. The airmen responded with machine gun fire. It was later learned that Asladdin had been one of the bandits, his aide-de-camp the second. They had on their persons weapons, large amounts of money, lists and photographs of dushman. Having lost its leader, the band surrendered to Afghan authorities the next day. DRA Minister of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs Solayman Laeq flew out to the Soviet airmen and thanked the pilots for helping to wipe it out.

Another time V. Ochirov had flown out on an assigned route together with Captain Vladimir Komaritsin. From the command post they received a report that groups of armed people had left a village located on the route and headed for the mountains. They had to be careful. The helicopters had just reached the top of the mountain ridge, when the airmen spotted some sort of dark-gray bulges on the opposite slope. "Dushmany!" V. Ochirov guessed. "They are hugging the ground under their robes and capes to avoid detection." He immediately decided to report the band to the Afghan comrades. He had barely done so, when large-caliber machine guns struck from the ground. Trails of lead reached toward the rotary-wing machines. The crews did not flinch, however. At the leader's command, covering one another, the helicopter crews answered the dushmany with fire. They were forced to take to the ground again. Afghan fightingmen had arrived at the site by then. And so, a large counterrevolutionary band was eliminated thanks to the help of the Soviet airmen.

Lieutenant Colonel V. Ochirov, member of the Kalmyk people, Communist and military sniper-pilot, flew hundreds of extremely difficult flights in the skies over Afghanistan. He was awarded the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union by Marshal of the Soviet Union and USSR Minister of Defense S.L. Sokolov.

Last year Lieutenant Colonel V. Ochirov graduated by correspondence from the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin and was given a new assignment. The collective presently headed by him is successfully accomplishing its combat and political training tasks.

...The Soviet Air Forces have produced many airmen of the new generation in recent years who have glorified their names with feats. The title Hero of the Soviet Union has been conferred upon Major Generals of Aviation V. Pavlov and V. Kot, Lieutenant Colonels V. Shcherbakov, Ye. Zelnyakov and P. Ruban, Major V. Gaynutdinov and other military pilots.

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ALLEGED GUERRILLA LETTERS 'PROVE' PAKISTAN-DUSHMAN COMPLICITY

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Feb 86 p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent G. Ustinov reporting from the Jalalabad-Kabul area: "Sinister Conspiracy Behind the Scenes of Subversion." Last of six alleged letters is dated 10 Jan 86.]

[Text] Incursions by Pakistani troops in the Khyber Pass area are going on for the third month. For the third month, courageous Pushtun fighters of the Afridi and Shinwari tribes are repelling the outrageous and disgraceful soldiers. At traditional crowded jirgahs [councils], representatives of the "free tribes zone": the Momand, Waziri, Ahmadzay and Salarzay, are openly and publicly supporting their struggle.

They do not want to reconcile themselves to the presence of numerous combat training camps of the dushman soldiers and the arms depots belonging to the Afghan counterrevolution on territory that was theirs from time immemorial. Their resentment is also growing against the tyranny of the dushman gangs, who are active not only in the vicinity of these camps, but in the entire border area. They do not intend anymore to let pass through their lands mercenary bands of world reaction that are bringing grief and death to their Afghan Pushtun kinsmen.

Seeing the unity and solidarity of the free tribes and not finding support among the Pakistani public, which is sharply critical of punitive operations, the military regime of Islamabad turned--to whom would you think?--to the very same murders and rapists from the camp of the Afghan counterrevolution. The argument put forward was simple: if you do not pacify the tribes, the situation will get worse for you also; so mobilize your thugs before it is too late.

And immediately feverish activity began in the camps of the Afghan emigration. Volcanos of "creative" passions began to erupt at meetings and councils. A flood of circulars and instructions poured out to the ringleaders of the bands who were located at "winter quarters" in the area of the Pushtun tribes and in Afghanistan itself.

During a recent trip to the city of Jalalabad and the Torkham frontier post along the DRA border with Pakistan, I was able to meet and talk with dozens of

Pushtuns of the Afridi and Shinwari tribes who abandoned their kishlaks [villages] and fields that were burned by members of punitive expeditions. They talked about the violent activity of the dushman cutthroats who, literally on command, took arms against indigenous inhabitants of the Khyber and Bajowr regions bordering with Afghanistan. However, why "literally"? The command was very real. Proof of this are the numerous documents captured by the Pushtun soldiers in battles with the enemy and brought to Afghanistan.

I would like to acquaint the reader with samples of the instructions of counterrevolutionary "parties" to their subordinates and letters replying to the chiefs from Peshawar. But first I will make the observation that all of them are printed on official forms of the bandit offices, bearing seals and sprawling signatures. It is perfectly obvious: the senders in no way supposed that their correspondence would end up in undesirable hands. [Sample letters follow.]

The Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRD). 19 December 1985.

To partisan detachment commander Taz Gol.

Dear broter. Greetings! You know that the situation in the Pushtun tribe area has gotten worse. Supporters and agents of the Kabul regime rose up against the Pakistani authorities and Islam. You must assist your Muslim brother Ziaul-Haq in his struggle. During operations at Khyber you must fight side by side with Pakistani soldiers. This is an order of the leader of our party Muhammad Nabi.

Carefully conceal your participation in the suppression of the rebellion. The military committee. Signature, seal.

Afghanistan.

To the commander of Kunar province.

I salute you, our brother! I pray that you won a victory in the holy war against the atheists. The situation in the "free tribes zone" is worsening. The apostates are not giving in, and it could happen that the authority of Ziaul Haq could diminish in these places. Then our jihad ("holy war".-- G. U.) also will not be a success. Therefore, I assign you the task of making contact as fast as possible with the Pakistani soldiers near our area and, together with them, actively fight against the atheists, who are unworthy of bearing the name of Pushtun. I am sending experienced people to help you. Our American friends have instructed them what has to be done in the new situation. The main thing is to maintain the strictest secrecy, so that the people of the rebellious tribes do not know that you are cooperating with the Pakistani army.

Sabgatulla Mojadeddi, leader of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front.
Peshawar. 24 December 1985.

Islamic Party of Afghanistan-2 (IPA-2).

28 December 1985

To the Commander of the 5th Partisan Detachment IPA-2.

Our brother. In accordance with the order of the head of the party, mowlawi [teacher of Islamic law] Yunes Khalis, you are commissioned to join with Pakistani soldiers, dress in their uniforms and start to operate with them in Bajowr. You are to receive clothing from the governor of SEPP (northwestern border province of Pakistan.--G. U.) in person. Military committee of IPA-2.

Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOA)

30 December 1985

To partisan commander Faziul-Khan.

The leader of the IOA, the honorable professor Rabbani, asked me to convey to you his satisfaction with all of the combat operations you conducted in Bajowr. you are to continue these operations. The professor recommends that you dress all of your people in clothing typical of the indigenous inhabitants of these towns. Turn captured rebels over to the Pakistani army. Information on the intentions of the tribes is important to the army.

Burn this letter after reading it. IOA military committee.

The Islamic Union of Mujahedins of Afghansitan (ISMA).

Peshawar. 10 January 1986.

Assalam aleikum [peace be with you], brother, fighter, leader Afandi!

I am reporting to you that several nights ago in an operation against atheistic Muslims we sent 15 persons to hell. We also captured eight machineguns from them. We had five wounded, and one of our detachment fighters, Jan Muhammad, was killed in the fight. God brought us in to this world, and to him we well return. Our friend Michael is helping me write this letter. He asks me to tell you that he is pleased with us. Haji Ata Mad.

The next letter requires some explanation. It was found together with the aforementioned IRD instructions in a field pouch of the bandit ringleader Taz Gol who was killed in combat. It did not reach the addressee.

Peshawar. IRD headquarters.

Dear brother and fighter! Greetings! We are very grateful to the military committee for the arms which you sent us. I am letting you know that one of our English friends also arrived with the convoy. He knows our language very well, and holds training sessions with members of my detachment every day. We guard him carefully, so that he can return to Peshawar safe and sound. The medicine arrived--there is a great need for it. Taz Gol. 7 January 1986.

I cited only a small portion of the documents, instructions and letters captured by Pushtun soldiers during military operations in Khyber and Bajowr. But even that which is reported is clear and irrefutable proof of the active participation of the dushmans in a villainous war against the Pushtun tribes. Another question--why is this participation so carefully concealed, why is it recommended that the "brotherhood" of the Pakistani soldiers and the dushman rabble be kept in strict secrecy, why did this game of hide and seek and disguises become necessary?

It appears you do not have to go far to get an answer to this. It is clearly understood on dushman staffs that, if the dushmans begin to fight openly in Khyber and Bajowr, they will ultimately incite a Pushtun rebellion against themselves. It will get too hot for the bandits, and then they will have to remove both the training camps and the arms depots and find refuge in another locality.

Neither is another detail of events in the Pushtun tribal area news--the directing role of foreign advisers. They have now been training and coaching dushman cutthroats for more than six months. More than one-and-a-half thousand foreign "friends" and "brothers" are operating in sabotage-terrorist training centers and directly in gangs.

But as the saying goes, murder will out. The existence of the "brotherhood in secrecy" was brought to light. The Pushtuns who are subjected to aggression are justifiably demanding that the world know about the criminal conspiracy going on behind their backs and about the joint plans of the Pakistani army, the Afghan reaction, their foreign benefactors, and about their criminal operations, which are aimed at the total enslavement of the Pushtun tribes.

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